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Using CDD for Post-conflict reintegration:
Lessons from the impact evaluation of the
BRA-KDP Program in Aceh
Adrian Morel, Conflict & Development Program, WB Indonesia
Presentation to the
Development Impact Evaluation Initiative (DIME) workshop
Dubai, June 1st, 2010
o Assistance to conflict victims through community-based approach increasingly
used in post-conflict reintegration programs
o CDD approach viewed as an effective mechanism for channeling such support:
o Ensure the right people benefit (targeting)
o Funds are effectively used (transparency, accountability)
o Help repair the social fabric (participation, inclusion)
o Based on assumption that CDD may not only achieve welfare outcomes but
also lead to improvements in social and state-society relations
o The BRA-KDP program (2006-2007) delivered US$ 20.4 million in assistance to
conflict victims in 1,724 villages (one third of Aceh)
o This presentation is based on a large-scale mixed methods evaluation of the
o Main findings:
o BRA-KDP successful in reaching a large number of conflict-affected people (over
o Substantial welfare impacts
o Less successful in improving social relations and building trust in state
Reintegration in Aceh
o Six months after the Dec 26th 2004 tsunami, the Helsinki MoU
peace accord (August 2005) ended 30 years of separatist
conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the
Government of Indonesia (GoI):
o 30,000 deaths; over 400,000 displaced
o US$ 10.7 billion in damage and loss; 50% of rural
infrastructure damaged or destroyed
o 1.5 million Acehnese or 39% of the population consider
themselves conflict victims
o Government Reintegration Fund (US$ 150 million) set up to
help combatants, prisoners and conflict-affected groups
o The Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA) established to manage
funds and programs – Supervision by National Planning
Agency (Bappenas)
Community-Based Reintegration Assistance
for Conflict Victims (BRA-KDP)
o Genesis of the BRA-KDP program:
o Initial attempts to individually target victims problematic – BRA lacked
capacity and proper mechanisms to verify claims
o Change to use of Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) which
already operated in every village in Aceh
o Targeting devolved to community-level, with safeguards to ensure
funds are used effectively in a transparent and accountable manner
o BRA-KDP mechanisms:
o Village meetings, facilitated by KDP staff, decided on local criteria for
who was a victim and how funds should be spent
o Open menu: communities can decide whether to finance public
infrastructure or economically beneficial private goods
o Ex-combatants not eligible (they receive targeted support from other
BRA program)
Selecting Sub-districts to Receive BRA-KDP
• Program aimed to target the most
conflict-affected sub-districts. Combined
several variables into an index of conflict
• Only sub-districts that surpasses a
spending capacity threshold (60 percent
disbursement of 2005 KDP funds) were
Within Sub-district Allocations
• Within selected sub-districts, all villages get a block grant allocation
• Grant sizes depend on conflict intensity (sub-district level) and village
Community-Based Reintegration Assistance
for Conflict Victims (BRA-KDP)
o From 2006-2007, US$ 20.4 million channeled to 1724
villages in 67 sub-districts (one-third of Aceh)
o BRA-KDP objectives: providing assistance to civilians
most affected by the conflict in ways that improve their
well-being, enhance relations between groups, build
trust in Gvt
o How successful was BRA-KDP in improving the welfare of
conflict victims, improving social relations and building
trust in the state?
o What does the BRA-KDP experience tell us about how
CDD can be used for reintegration in other post-conflict
Learning from BRA-KDP: Data Sources
o Primary data source: the Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods
Survey (ARLS)
o Administered in all 67 treatment sub-districts and 68 matched control subdistricts, one year after program completion (2008)
o Interviews with 2,150 randomly selected households (5 per villlage), 460
village heads and around 1,000 ex-combatants
o Statistical strategies for ex-post matching of treatment and control subdistricts, and account for systematic differences between treatment and
control areas (sampling weights to account for variation in village and
household size; clustering at level of treatment) --- this allows for accurate
estimation and attribution of program impacts
o Design and data analysis by Macartan Humphreys (Columbia), Jeremy
Weinstein (Stanford), Laura Paler (Columbia), Yuhki Tajima (Harvard) with
help from C&D team
o Field Implementation by AC Nielsen
Learning from BRA-KDP: Data Sources
o Management Information System (MIS): Designed
to collect info on program progress, participation
rates, proposal recapitulation, conflict victims
maps, complaints, financial flows
o Supervision missions and facilitator surveys
Reaching Conflict Victims
o A large number of people benefited from BRA-KDP:
233,282 direct beneficiaries (or 22% of the overall
population of target sub-districts).
o Challenge: widespread perception that everyone in Aceh
is a conflict victim to some extent – tension between a
tendency to spread assistance broadly to satisfy
everyone and avoid creating disputes, and the need to
prioritize the most-affected
Reaching Conflict Victims
o Multiple levels for trying to reach conflict victims:
o Selecting most conflict affected sub-districts (but conditional
on spending capacity and plans for a second round of
o Villages in more conflict affected areas receive more
o Prioritizing conflict victims within villages, although others can
also benefit (community decision-making)
o Throughout analysis, we look at whether treatment effects
are different for conflict-affected and most conflict-affected.
These were based primarily on self-reported answers to the
Targeting within Villages
Communities used wide variety of criteria and approaches for
deciding who was a victim and who should benefit
(1) Degree of conflict-affectedness
Asong Tongpeuding village, Titeu Keumala sub-district, Pidie
• Four categories of conflict victims were decided upon, each receiving a different amount of assistance
• High: people whose house was burned (Rp. 3.5 million/HH); Medium: people who had a death in the family (Rp. 2
million/HH); Low: people who were tortured (Rp. 1 million/HH); common community members (Rp. 500,000 /HH)
(2) Degree of conflict-affectedness and economic need
Meriah Jaya village, Timang Gajah sub-district, Bener Meriah
• Out of 322 HHs, 167 were selected as beneficiaries. Beneficiaries were divided into three groups:
• HHs who suffered a death in the family, or had houses and fields destroyed; HHs who suffered trauma or who
were unable to tend fields; Poor HHs that did not possess land or did not have money to purchase food
• The amount of assistance was scaled with the first group receiving the largest amount of assistance
(3) Degree of conflict-affectedness and prior receipt of economic assistance
Timanang Gading village, Kabayakan sub-district, Aceh Tengah
• Twelve out of 49 IDPs were prioritized as BRA-KDP beneficiaries
• Prioritized because they had not received assistance and were severely affected
• Each beneficiary received Rp. 2.5 million. The remaining block grant funds were used for community projects.
Prioritizing Conflict Victims
• Conflict victims were more likely to be benefit from BRA-KDP
than non-victims.
– 54 percent of conflict victims were in treated areas, and 44% of these
got benefits. The probability of benefitting for victims was 24%
– 41 percent of non-victims were in treated areas and 40 percent of
those got benefits. The probability of non-victim benefitting was 16%
• Conflict victims got more
Figure3.3: Average amounts of assistance perceived per victimhood category (.000 Rp)
Most-Affected Victims
Perceptions of the Program
The program was very popular:
• 96% of villagers & 98% of most-affected thought BRA-KDP helpful
• A useful injection of capital; provided victims with a sense that their suffering
was acknowledged and compensated
• Only 12% of conflict victims thought they did not benefit enough
Welfare Impacts: Poverty
BRA-KDP resulted in an 11 percent decrease in the share of
households in the village classified as poor
Welfare Impacts: Assets
Index of 2008 asset holdings
Individuals in
Individuals in
Conflict victims
Most conflict-affected
*** Significant at 99%; ** Significant at 95%; * Significant at 90%. The table reports population average
responses (with sample N’s below, where total sample size is 2315), and the difference for populations in
treatment and control communities using least squares and instrumental variable regressions. All regressions
control for conflict and spending capacity, their quadratic and cubed terms, and their interaction.
Question: How many of the following things do you or a member of your household possess?
Gains for conflict victims in overall asset holdings
Largest difference was for motorbikes
Little evidence that the project directly funded motorbikes. Program
participants used money they generated from extra economic
opportunities to buy bikes.
Welfare Impacts: Land Use
m of land that is farmed by
Individuals in
Individuals in
Conflict victims
*** Significant at 99%; ** Significant at 95%; * Significant at 90%.
Question: How many m of land is being farmed by this household?
Most Conflict-affected
Conflict victims in treatment communities have more than
7500 sq-meters of additional land cleared as a result of the
program (a doubling of land use)
Welfare Impacts: Subjective Perceptions
Conflict victims 18% more likely to report improvements in welfare in project
areas than control areas
Welfare Impacts: Other Measures
o Weaker or no improvements found with respect to:
o Employment
o Health and education outcomes
o Availability of amenities
o A possible result of:
o Choice of villagers for private goods
o One-round program – needs more sustained investments
Social Impacts
• Acceptance of returning groups, reported social tensions,
measures of collective action capacity / involvement in
associational life: similar between treatment and control
• No consistent evidence of impacts – positive or negative – of
BRA-KDP on attitudes towards government / state
• These findings contrast with other research on KDP in
Indonesia: positive impacts on various measures of social
• Might result from BRA-KDP being one-off and spent on private
goods – less opportunities for cohesion-building collective
Social Impacts: Acceptance of Former Combatants
• Communities in project areas more accepting of ex-combatants BUT
… conflict victims significantly less likely to accept former combatants
after program implementation
• Reasons: Ex-GAM extorted funds from BRA-KDP, leading to higher
levels of non-acceptance; BRA-KDP empowered non-GAM groups in
society, enabling them to voice their non-acceptance of GAM
Conclusion 1: Strong evidence of welfare impacts
o Strong evidence on welfare gains
11% reduction in share of poor households
Doubling of land use for victims
Reported improvements in welfare
Asset increases
o Shows CDD projects can be an effective mechanism for :
o rapid compensation in ways hat have significant welfare impacts
in post-conflict environments
o delivering private goods
o Scope for post-conflict ‘compensation’ projects that have
developmental impacts in other conflict-affected areas
Conclusion 2: Social cohesion impacts
o Some negative impacts on acceptance of former combatants:
o Failure in reintegration programs targeted at ex-combatants had a
negative spillover effect on BRA-KDP
o Problems of separating victims and combatants: Ex-GAM more likely
to cause problems in BRA-KDP villages where they were excluded from
receiving benefits. Lower levels of conflict in BRA-KDP locations where
GAM were among the beneficiaries.
o Need to better link CDD with other post-conflict programs /
possibly best to have same programs for ex-combatants and
civilians rather than separate ones
o CDD not a “silver bullet” peace-building solution. It does not
inevitably results in enhanced social cohesion, in particular when
programs have a limited duration.
• Continue to experiment with CDD as a mechanism for
reintegration, gather information on what works and
what does not, where and why in order to inform the
design of future post-conflict interventions
• In post-conflict areas where relations between former
combatants and civilians are relatively good, deliver
assistance to both groups altogether using the same
• Deliver assistance over multiple rounds to maximize
social impacts
Full Reports
o Adrian Morel, Makiko Watanabe, Rob Wrobel (2009),
“Delivering Assistance to Conflict-Affected Communities:
The BRA-KDP Program in Aceh”. ISDP No. 13. Jakarta, WB
o Patrick Barron, Macartan Humphreys, Laura Paler and
Jeremy Weinstein (2009), “Community-Based
Reintegration in Aceh: Assessing the Impacts of BRAKDP”. ISDP No. 12. Jakarta, WB
Available online at:
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