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Diamonds and conflict
Diamonds and conflict
Lecture at HEI, 8 May 2007
Course E 586 Resource and Environmental Conflict
Nils Petter Gleditsch
Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW at
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)
& Department of Sociology and Political Science,
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Diamonds and conflict
Environmental factors in conflict: Five views
• Neomalthusianism: Resource scarcity leads to conflict
• Political ecology: It's the distribution of resources!
• Cornucopianism: There is no inherent resource scarcity
• Resource curse: Resource abundance is the problem
• Institutionalism: Cooperation can overcome ABUNDANCE*
* as well as scarcity, of course
Diamonds and conflict
Problems with existing studies
• with the indicators of natural resources
–
–
–
–
do all primary commodities have the same effect?
endogeneity
are we really measuring underdevelopment?
spurious relationship?
• with the level of measurement
– national vs. subnational
– administrative subunits vs. pixels
Diamonds and conflict
Priority resources
Resource
Conlit
Value Lootable
Strategic Stable price
Illegal
Country (ex.)
Gold
x
x
(x)
(x)
Ghana
Diamonds
x
x
(x)
x
Angola
Gemstones
x
x
x
Chromite
Sri Lanka
x
x
South Africa
x
D R Congo
x
Sudan
Tantalite
x
x
Oil
x
x
Natural gas
x
Oil pipelines
x
x
Timber
x
(x)
Drugs
x
x
(x)
Netherlands
Azerbaijan
(x)
Burma
x
Conlit: Mentioned in the conflict literature
Other metals: Aluminium (Ghana), copper (Zambia), silver (D R Congo), tin (Bolivia), uranium (Niger)
Source: Gilmore et al. (2005), Olsson (2006), and other sources
Afghanistan
Diamonds and conflict
Determinants of civil war
Diamonds can –
• Motivation
– greed, grievance
• provide income for corrupt
governments and a motivation to
overthrow them
• provide economic opportunity for
• Opportunity
rebel movements through looting
– geographical, economic and extortion
• Identity
– group formation
• contribute to strengthening the
identity of groups that stand to gain
from secession or autonomy
Diamonds and conflict
Diamond data
• Discovery
• Production
• Exports
• Geological type
• Location
Diamonds and conflict
Types of diamonds
Primary
Secondary
Lootability
Low
High
Extension
Point
Diffuse
Location
Proximate or
distant
Proximate or
distant
Diamonds and conflict
Diamond production, 1990–99
Source: Olsson (2007: Table 1)
Diamonds and conflict
Overview of DIADATA
Number of records
Number of countries
% of records with geographic coordinates
Number of countries with production
% of records coded as active mining activity
% of records coded as probable mining activity
Number of countries with no production
% of records coded as no mining activity
% of records coded as unknown mining status
Number of countries with primary deposits
% of records coded as primary diamond deposits
Number of countries with secondary deposits
% of records coded as secondary diamond deposits
Number of countries with marine deposits
% of records coded as marine diamond deposits
% of records coded as unknown geological form
% of all records with known discovery date
% of records with production and known production date
Source: Gilmore et al. (2005)
1,168
53
95.5
31
67.6
5.48
22
12.9
14.0
31
20.2
40
74.6
3
2.83
2.40
39.5
38.8
Diamonds and conflict
Effects of diamonds
• Slow economic growth
• Factional, predatory state
• Looting, conflict
Source: Olsson (2006, 2007)
Diamonds and conflict
Diamond production and growth, 1990–99
Source: Olsson (2003, 2006, 2007)
Diamonds and conflict
Diamond disturbances
Civil war: Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, D R Congo
Rent seeking, corruption, etc: Central African Republic, Côte
d'Ivoire, Guinea, Uganda, Republic of Congo
Funding of terrorism: Hezbollah (through Lebanese traders in
Africa)
Source: Olsson (2006: 1140–1141
Diamonds and conflict
Mechanisms linking natural resources to conflict
Greedy rebels
- domestic group engage in quasi-criminal activity
- natural resources increase the value of the state
- bid for secession (where resources are concentrated)
Greedy outsiders
- states
- corporations
Grievance
- emerging inequalities
- trade shocks
- environmental damage, forced migration
- greater inequality than other resources
Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513)
Diamonds and conflict
… and more mechanisms
Feasibility
- funding rebellion through control of production
- selling 'booty futures'
Weak state
- untaxed citizens have little influence over government
- the state fails to create a strong bureaucracy
Sparse networks
- weak manufacturing sector and low internal trade and thus low
understanding between cultures
- and seven mechanisms linking natural resources to conflict duration
Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513)
Diamonds and conflict
Empirical findings
Diamond production per capita positively linked to onset of conflict 196099
Both for global sample and Africa sample
In global sample, holds for politically unstable states, for politically strong
states, but not for 'Weberian states'
States with natural resources (including diamonds) have shorter conflicts
States with natural resources (including diamonds) experience military
victories
More support for grievances and weak state structures than for booty
futures and state capture – but cannot distinguish between all
mechanisms
Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513)
Diamonds and conflict
Diamond Production and
Onset of Internal Armed Conflict, 1946–2001
D IAM O N D S
C O N F L IC T
S E C O N D AR Y D IAM O N D S
A ngola
G abon
M ali
B urm a
G hana
N am ibia (S outh A frica) C ote d'Ivoire (conflict
R ussia (S
2002)
oviet U nion)
C entral A frican R epublic
G uinea
R ussia (S oviet U nion) G uinea
S ierra Leone
C hina
India
S ierra Leone
India
S outh A frica
C ongo
Indonesia S outh A frica
Lesotho
USA
C ongo/Z aire
Lesotho
T hailand
C ote d'Ivoire (2002)
Liberia
V enezuela
22
N O C O N F L IC T
71%
10
79
A ustralia
S urinam
A ustralia
S w aziland
B razil
T anzania
B otsw ana
T anzania
C anada
Z im babw e
C hina
7
9
5
81%
N O D IAM O N D S
C ongo/Z aire N am ibia (S outh A frica)
21
G uyana
% of states that
have had conflict
P R IM AR Y D IAM O N D S
101
59%
44%
From: Lujala et al. (2005), For the conflict data, see Gleditsch et al. (2002) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. The list of
independent states follows Gleditsch & Ward (1999) and the diamonds data are from Gilmore et al. (2005).
Diamonds and conflict
Civil war onset and diamonds
– discovery and production, 1946–99
D ia m o n d d is c o v e r y
C o e f.
0 .4 5 3
p - v a lu e
0 .0 3 0
0 .2 0 8
D ia m o n d p r o d u c t io n
0 .4 6 1
0 .0 3 5
0 .2 1 8
P r im a r y d ia m o n d d is c .
0 .2 7 9
0 .2 9 4
0 .2 6 6
P r im a r y d ia m o n d p r o d .
0 .2 9 3
0 .3 6 2
0 .3 2 1
S e c o n d a r y d ia m o n d d is c .
0 .5 7 4
0 .0 0 6
0 .2 0 8
S e c o n d a r y d ia m o n d p r o d .
0 .5 8 1
0 .0 0 8
0 .2 1 9
S ta n d a rd e rro rs g iv e n in ita lic s
Bivariate results. Conflict data from Fearon & Laitin (2003), diamond data from Gilmore et al. (2005).
Diamonds and conflict
Internal armed conflict and diamonds, 1989–99
D ia m o n d d is c o ve ry
C o e f.
0 .1 0 2
P va lu e
0 .2 4 4
0 .0 9 0
D ia m o n d p ro d u c tio n
0 .1 5 4
0 .1 0 4
0 .0 9 8
P rim a ry d ia m o n d d is c .
0 .1 3 4
0 .2 0 0
0 .1 0 9
P rim a ry d ia m o n d p ro d .
0 .0 4 1
0 .5 0 7
0 .0 6 1
S e c o n d a ry d ia m o n d d is c .
0 .1 4 4
0 .1 1 3
0 .0 9 4
S e c o n d a ry d ia m o n d p ro d .
0 .2 1 1
0 .0 3 6
0 .1 0 4
S ta n d a rd e rro rs g iv e n in ita lic s
Bivariate results. Conflict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict, diamonds data from
Gilmore et al. (2005).
Diamonds and conflict
Multivariate results
Production of primary diamonds not associated with onset, but
negatively associated with incidence of civil war 1945-99
Production of secondary diamonds not associated with either
onset or incidence
Interaction between secondary production and ethnic
fractionalization positively associated with incidence of civil war
Secondary production associated with onset of ethnic war, 194599
And particularly after the Cold War
But diamond occurrence not associated with war
Conflict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict, diamonds data from Gilmore et al. (2005).
Diamonds and conflict
Diamonds and conflict I
F
!
!
Congo
Congo/Zaire
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!!
!
!
! !!
! !
! !!
!!!!
!!
! !! !!
!!
!!
! !
Tanzania
!!!
!
!
Zambia
!
Angola
!
!
Secondary diamond deposit
Conflict zone 1998 - 1999
1989–99. Diamond data from Gilmore et al. (2005), conflict data from Buhaug & Gates (2002) and Buhaug & Rød (2006).
Diamonds and conflict
Diamonds and conflict II
Source: Gilmore et al. (2005: 269)
Diamonds and conflict
Diamonds and conflict in Africa, 1970–2001:
A disaggregated analysis
Areas with territorial conflict tend to be further away from
secondary diamond locations
Areas with government conflict tend to be closer to
secondary diamond locations
This also holds when using control variables
But claims to try to topple the government may be phony –
warlords are satisfied with the loot
Source: Buhaug & Rød (2006).
Diamonds and conflict
Why some are peaceful, others not
• Botswana vs. Sierra Leone
• Kimberlites vs. alluvial diamonds
• Kimberlites usually in deserts or Arctic areas, alluvial deposits in rough
terrain (jungle)
• Good institution
• But what determines the institutions?
• The role of De Beers
Diamonds and conflict
Conflict diamonds
'Conflict diamonds are diamonds that originate from areas controlled by
forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized
governments and are used to fund military action in opposition to those
governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.'
Source: United Nations (2002)
Diamonds and conflict
Countermeasures
• UN Security Council 1998, two resolutions that prohibited direct or indirect
imports of diamonds from Angola
• UN Security Council 2000, ban on all imports of diamonds supplied by the
RUF rebels in Sierra Leone
• May 2000, Kimberley meeting
• December 2000, UN General Assembly votes to create certification scheme
• 2002, ban on all imports from Liberia, due to links to the RUF
• 4 May 2007: Sanctions against Liberia lifted
• Ghana: Diamond exchange under the control of the state
• D R Congo 2003: assisting small-scale mining sector with a view to bringing
it into the formal economy
Diamonds and conflict
Kimberley Process
States and organizations satisfying the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme as of May 2007
Angola
Armenia
Australia
Bangladesh
Belarus
Botswana
Brazil
Canada
Central African Republic
China, People's Republic of
Congo, Democratic Republic
Cote D' Ivoire
Croatia
European Community
Ghana
Guinea
Guyana
India
Indonesia
Israel
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Lao, Democratic
Republic of
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Malaysia
Mauritius
Namibia
New Zealand
Norway
Russia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Switzerland
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United States of America
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zimbabwe
+ 'Chinese Taipei'
46 + 1 countries/organizations, accounting for 99,8% of the world's production of rough diamonds
(www.kimberleyprocess.com)
Diamonds and conflict
Effective?
Conflict diamonds from Angola, D R Congo (Kinshasa), Liberia, and
Sierra Leone have been smuggled to neighboring countries that are not
under sanctions, like Central African Republic, Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville) and re-exported from there
2005–06: Neither Angola (2004), D R Congo (2001), Liberia (2003),
Sierra Leone (2000) listed with armed conflict
Source: United Nations (2001b), cited from Olsson (2007). Conflict data from www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict.
Year in parentheses: Last year with armed conflict > 25 battle deaths, according to Uppsala/PRIO conflict database
(www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict)
Diamonds and conflict
References
Buhaug & Gates, 2002
Buhaug, Halvard & Päivi Lujala, 2005. 'Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in Quantitative Studies of Civil War', Political Geography 24(4): 399–418
Buhaug, Halvard & Jan Ketil Rød, 2006. 'Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 1970–2001', Political Geography 25(3): 315–335
Fearon & Laitin, 2003
Gilmore, Elisabeth, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Päivi Lujala & Jan Ketil Rød, 2005. 'Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset', Conflict Management and Peace Science
22(3): 257–292
Gleditsch & Ward, 1999
Gleditsch et al., 2002
Humphreys, Macartan, 2005. 'Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution – Uncovering the Mechanisms', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 508–537
Klare, Michael T. 2001. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Metropolitan
* Lujala, Päivi; Nils Petter Gleditsch & Elisabeth Gilmore, 2005. 'A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4):
538–562
Olsson, Ola, 2003. 'Conflict Diamonds', Working paper (86). Gothenburg: Department of Economics, University of Göteborg (earlier version of Olsson, 2007)
Olsson, Ola, 2006. 'Diamonds Are a Rebel's Best Friend', World Economy 29(8): 1133–1150
Olsson, Ola, 2007. 'Conflict Diamonds', Journal of Development Economics 82(2): 267–286
•Ross, Michael, 2006. 'A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War', Annual Review of Political Science 9: 265–300
United Nations, 2001a. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of
Congo. S/2001/357. New York: United Nations
United Nations, 2001b. Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of Congo. S/2001/1072. New York: United Nations
United Nations, 2002. 'Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, www.un.org/peace/africa/diamond.html
For material on the Kimberley Process, see www.kimberleyprocess.com
Diamonds and conflict
Next week: Tuesday 15 May
Water and Conflict, with student presentations
by Daniela Fabel, Michael Jakob, Jerome
Lacourrege, and Samuel Spörri. Presentation
on Angola (postponed from this week) by
Andrea Buetler before the lecture).
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