Diamonds and conflict Diamonds and conflict Lecture at HEI, 8 May 2007 Course E 586 Resource and Environmental Conflict Nils Petter Gleditsch Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW at International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) & Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology Diamonds and conflict Environmental factors in conflict: Five views • Neomalthusianism: Resource scarcity leads to conflict • Political ecology: It's the distribution of resources! • Cornucopianism: There is no inherent resource scarcity • Resource curse: Resource abundance is the problem • Institutionalism: Cooperation can overcome ABUNDANCE* * as well as scarcity, of course Diamonds and conflict Problems with existing studies • with the indicators of natural resources – – – – do all primary commodities have the same effect? endogeneity are we really measuring underdevelopment? spurious relationship? • with the level of measurement – national vs. subnational – administrative subunits vs. pixels Diamonds and conflict Priority resources Resource Conlit Value Lootable Strategic Stable price Illegal Country (ex.) Gold x x (x) (x) Ghana Diamonds x x (x) x Angola Gemstones x x x Chromite Sri Lanka x x South Africa x D R Congo x Sudan Tantalite x x Oil x x Natural gas x Oil pipelines x x Timber x (x) Drugs x x (x) Netherlands Azerbaijan (x) Burma x Conlit: Mentioned in the conflict literature Other metals: Aluminium (Ghana), copper (Zambia), silver (D R Congo), tin (Bolivia), uranium (Niger) Source: Gilmore et al. (2005), Olsson (2006), and other sources Afghanistan Diamonds and conflict Determinants of civil war Diamonds can – • Motivation – greed, grievance • provide income for corrupt governments and a motivation to overthrow them • provide economic opportunity for • Opportunity rebel movements through looting – geographical, economic and extortion • Identity – group formation • contribute to strengthening the identity of groups that stand to gain from secession or autonomy Diamonds and conflict Diamond data • Discovery • Production • Exports • Geological type • Location Diamonds and conflict Types of diamonds Primary Secondary Lootability Low High Extension Point Diffuse Location Proximate or distant Proximate or distant Diamonds and conflict Diamond production, 1990–99 Source: Olsson (2007: Table 1) Diamonds and conflict Overview of DIADATA Number of records Number of countries % of records with geographic coordinates Number of countries with production % of records coded as active mining activity % of records coded as probable mining activity Number of countries with no production % of records coded as no mining activity % of records coded as unknown mining status Number of countries with primary deposits % of records coded as primary diamond deposits Number of countries with secondary deposits % of records coded as secondary diamond deposits Number of countries with marine deposits % of records coded as marine diamond deposits % of records coded as unknown geological form % of all records with known discovery date % of records with production and known production date Source: Gilmore et al. (2005) 1,168 53 95.5 31 67.6 5.48 22 12.9 14.0 31 20.2 40 74.6 3 2.83 2.40 39.5 38.8 Diamonds and conflict Effects of diamonds • Slow economic growth • Factional, predatory state • Looting, conflict Source: Olsson (2006, 2007) Diamonds and conflict Diamond production and growth, 1990–99 Source: Olsson (2003, 2006, 2007) Diamonds and conflict Diamond disturbances Civil war: Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, D R Congo Rent seeking, corruption, etc: Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Uganda, Republic of Congo Funding of terrorism: Hezbollah (through Lebanese traders in Africa) Source: Olsson (2006: 1140–1141 Diamonds and conflict Mechanisms linking natural resources to conflict Greedy rebels - domestic group engage in quasi-criminal activity - natural resources increase the value of the state - bid for secession (where resources are concentrated) Greedy outsiders - states - corporations Grievance - emerging inequalities - trade shocks - environmental damage, forced migration - greater inequality than other resources Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513) Diamonds and conflict … and more mechanisms Feasibility - funding rebellion through control of production - selling 'booty futures' Weak state - untaxed citizens have little influence over government - the state fails to create a strong bureaucracy Sparse networks - weak manufacturing sector and low internal trade and thus low understanding between cultures - and seven mechanisms linking natural resources to conflict duration Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513) Diamonds and conflict Empirical findings Diamond production per capita positively linked to onset of conflict 196099 Both for global sample and Africa sample In global sample, holds for politically unstable states, for politically strong states, but not for 'Weberian states' States with natural resources (including diamonds) have shorter conflicts States with natural resources (including diamonds) experience military victories More support for grievances and weak state structures than for booty futures and state capture – but cannot distinguish between all mechanisms Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513) Diamonds and conflict Diamond Production and Onset of Internal Armed Conflict, 1946–2001 D IAM O N D S C O N F L IC T S E C O N D AR Y D IAM O N D S A ngola G abon M ali B urm a G hana N am ibia (S outh A frica) C ote d'Ivoire (conflict R ussia (S 2002) oviet U nion) C entral A frican R epublic G uinea R ussia (S oviet U nion) G uinea S ierra Leone C hina India S ierra Leone India S outh A frica C ongo Indonesia S outh A frica Lesotho USA C ongo/Z aire Lesotho T hailand C ote d'Ivoire (2002) Liberia V enezuela 22 N O C O N F L IC T 71% 10 79 A ustralia S urinam A ustralia S w aziland B razil T anzania B otsw ana T anzania C anada Z im babw e C hina 7 9 5 81% N O D IAM O N D S C ongo/Z aire N am ibia (S outh A frica) 21 G uyana % of states that have had conflict P R IM AR Y D IAM O N D S 101 59% 44% From: Lujala et al. (2005), For the conflict data, see Gleditsch et al. (2002) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. The list of independent states follows Gleditsch & Ward (1999) and the diamonds data are from Gilmore et al. (2005). Diamonds and conflict Civil war onset and diamonds – discovery and production, 1946–99 D ia m o n d d is c o v e r y C o e f. 0 .4 5 3 p - v a lu e 0 .0 3 0 0 .2 0 8 D ia m o n d p r o d u c t io n 0 .4 6 1 0 .0 3 5 0 .2 1 8 P r im a r y d ia m o n d d is c . 0 .2 7 9 0 .2 9 4 0 .2 6 6 P r im a r y d ia m o n d p r o d . 0 .2 9 3 0 .3 6 2 0 .3 2 1 S e c o n d a r y d ia m o n d d is c . 0 .5 7 4 0 .0 0 6 0 .2 0 8 S e c o n d a r y d ia m o n d p r o d . 0 .5 8 1 0 .0 0 8 0 .2 1 9 S ta n d a rd e rro rs g iv e n in ita lic s Bivariate results. Conflict data from Fearon & Laitin (2003), diamond data from Gilmore et al. (2005). Diamonds and conflict Internal armed conflict and diamonds, 1989–99 D ia m o n d d is c o ve ry C o e f. 0 .1 0 2 P va lu e 0 .2 4 4 0 .0 9 0 D ia m o n d p ro d u c tio n 0 .1 5 4 0 .1 0 4 0 .0 9 8 P rim a ry d ia m o n d d is c . 0 .1 3 4 0 .2 0 0 0 .1 0 9 P rim a ry d ia m o n d p ro d . 0 .0 4 1 0 .5 0 7 0 .0 6 1 S e c o n d a ry d ia m o n d d is c . 0 .1 4 4 0 .1 1 3 0 .0 9 4 S e c o n d a ry d ia m o n d p ro d . 0 .2 1 1 0 .0 3 6 0 .1 0 4 S ta n d a rd e rro rs g iv e n in ita lic s Bivariate results. Conflict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict, diamonds data from Gilmore et al. (2005). Diamonds and conflict Multivariate results Production of primary diamonds not associated with onset, but negatively associated with incidence of civil war 1945-99 Production of secondary diamonds not associated with either onset or incidence Interaction between secondary production and ethnic fractionalization positively associated with incidence of civil war Secondary production associated with onset of ethnic war, 194599 And particularly after the Cold War But diamond occurrence not associated with war Conflict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict, diamonds data from Gilmore et al. (2005). Diamonds and conflict Diamonds and conflict I F ! ! Congo Congo/Zaire ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! !!!! !! ! !! !! !! !! ! ! Tanzania !!! ! ! Zambia ! Angola ! ! Secondary diamond deposit Conflict zone 1998 - 1999 1989–99. Diamond data from Gilmore et al. (2005), conflict data from Buhaug & Gates (2002) and Buhaug & Rød (2006). Diamonds and conflict Diamonds and conflict II Source: Gilmore et al. (2005: 269) Diamonds and conflict Diamonds and conflict in Africa, 1970–2001: A disaggregated analysis Areas with territorial conflict tend to be further away from secondary diamond locations Areas with government conflict tend to be closer to secondary diamond locations This also holds when using control variables But claims to try to topple the government may be phony – warlords are satisfied with the loot Source: Buhaug & Rød (2006). Diamonds and conflict Why some are peaceful, others not • Botswana vs. Sierra Leone • Kimberlites vs. alluvial diamonds • Kimberlites usually in deserts or Arctic areas, alluvial deposits in rough terrain (jungle) • Good institution • But what determines the institutions? • The role of De Beers Diamonds and conflict Conflict diamonds 'Conflict diamonds are diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.' Source: United Nations (2002) Diamonds and conflict Countermeasures • UN Security Council 1998, two resolutions that prohibited direct or indirect imports of diamonds from Angola • UN Security Council 2000, ban on all imports of diamonds supplied by the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone • May 2000, Kimberley meeting • December 2000, UN General Assembly votes to create certification scheme • 2002, ban on all imports from Liberia, due to links to the RUF • 4 May 2007: Sanctions against Liberia lifted • Ghana: Diamond exchange under the control of the state • D R Congo 2003: assisting small-scale mining sector with a view to bringing it into the formal economy Diamonds and conflict Kimberley Process States and organizations satisfying the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme as of May 2007 Angola Armenia Australia Bangladesh Belarus Botswana Brazil Canada Central African Republic China, People's Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic Cote D' Ivoire Croatia European Community Ghana Guinea Guyana India Indonesia Israel Japan Korea, Republic of Lao, Democratic Republic of Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Malaysia Mauritius Namibia New Zealand Norway Russia Sierra Leone Singapore South Africa Sri Lanka Switzerland Tanzania Thailand Togo Ukraine United Arab Emirates United States of America Venezuela Vietnam Zimbabwe + 'Chinese Taipei' 46 + 1 countries/organizations, accounting for 99,8% of the world's production of rough diamonds (www.kimberleyprocess.com) Diamonds and conflict Effective? Conflict diamonds from Angola, D R Congo (Kinshasa), Liberia, and Sierra Leone have been smuggled to neighboring countries that are not under sanctions, like Central African Republic, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) and re-exported from there 2005–06: Neither Angola (2004), D R Congo (2001), Liberia (2003), Sierra Leone (2000) listed with armed conflict Source: United Nations (2001b), cited from Olsson (2007). Conflict data from www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. Year in parentheses: Last year with armed conflict > 25 battle deaths, according to Uppsala/PRIO conflict database (www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict) Diamonds and conflict References Buhaug & Gates, 2002 Buhaug, Halvard & Päivi Lujala, 2005. 'Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in Quantitative Studies of Civil War', Political Geography 24(4): 399–418 Buhaug, Halvard & Jan Ketil Rød, 2006. 'Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 1970–2001', Political Geography 25(3): 315–335 Fearon & Laitin, 2003 Gilmore, Elisabeth, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Päivi Lujala & Jan Ketil Rød, 2005. 'Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset', Conflict Management and Peace Science 22(3): 257–292 Gleditsch & Ward, 1999 Gleditsch et al., 2002 Humphreys, Macartan, 2005. 'Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution – Uncovering the Mechanisms', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 508–537 Klare, Michael T. 2001. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Metropolitan * Lujala, Päivi; Nils Petter Gleditsch & Elisabeth Gilmore, 2005. 'A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 538–562 Olsson, Ola, 2003. 'Conflict Diamonds', Working paper (86). Gothenburg: Department of Economics, University of Göteborg (earlier version of Olsson, 2007) Olsson, Ola, 2006. 'Diamonds Are a Rebel's Best Friend', World Economy 29(8): 1133–1150 Olsson, Ola, 2007. 'Conflict Diamonds', Journal of Development Economics 82(2): 267–286 •Ross, Michael, 2006. 'A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War', Annual Review of Political Science 9: 265–300 United Nations, 2001a. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo. S/2001/357. New York: United Nations United Nations, 2001b. Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo. S/2001/1072. New York: United Nations United Nations, 2002. 'Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, www.un.org/peace/africa/diamond.html For material on the Kimberley Process, see www.kimberleyprocess.com Diamonds and conflict Next week: Tuesday 15 May Water and Conflict, with student presentations by Daniela Fabel, Michael Jakob, Jerome Lacourrege, and Samuel Spörri. Presentation on Angola (postponed from this week) by Andrea Buetler before the lecture).